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Police Investigative
Procedures and Juveniles
by A. David Copperthite

T

he Juvenile Causes Act! was established in Maryland to provide
for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the
child's best interest and the interest of the
public. 2 The state historically has maintained a parens patriae status of sovereign
guardianship over juveniles. 3 It is under
this status that the state exercises its power
over juveniles and provides specific constitutional rights to those under its jurisdictional control. 4
Although a juvenile proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding, it is not devoid of
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criminal aspects merely because it has
been given a civil label. 5 The fourteenth
amendment plays an important role in
juvenile proceedings.6 Even though these
proceedings take on an informal color,
rules of practice, procedure, evidence,
and standards of fairness must be observed. 7 The constitutional requirements
regarding juveniles must be met. 8

Taking a Child into Custody
The Juvenile Causes Act provides various methods for taking a child into cus-

tody.9 The court may issue a writ of attachment. 10 A law enforcement officer
may take the child into custody pursuant
to the laws of arrest.!! If a law enforcement officer or other person authorized
by the court has reason to believe the
child is in immediate danger and his removal is necessary for his protection, the
child may be taken into custody.!2 If the
child is a runaway,!3 a law enforcement
agent or court authorized party may take
the child into custody.!4
A police officer may make a warrantless
arrest of any person who commits or at-

tempts a felony or misdemeanor in his
presence or view. 15 He may arrest any
person who he reasonably believes has
committed the offense when he has probable cause to believe a felony or misdemeanor is being committed within his
presence or view. 16 A police officer may
also arrest any person he has probable
cause to believe has committed a felony or
misdemeanor regardless of whether the
crime was committed in his presence or
view. 17 This section of the Crimes and
Punishments Article l8 also provides for
other grounds for warrantless arrests. 19
Basically, if a misdemeanor or felony is
not committed within the officer's presence or view, probable cause is required
for an arrest. 20
The Juvenile Causes Act affords a law
enforcement officer the power to take a
child into custody pursuant to the laws of
arrest. 21 In In re Appeal No. 245,22 deputy
sheriffs investigating a bicycle theft "understood" the juvenile had been seen riding around on a bike similar to the stolen
one. 23 The police officers testified that
they had reason to believe the juvenile
was involved with the theft.24 The court
concluded that the taking of the child into
custody was unlawful because there was
no probable cause pursuant to the laws of
arrest. 25 The court also noted that mere
suspicion is not equivalent to probable
cause and is therefore insufficient for a
juvenile arrest. 26

Detention and Shelter Care
Responsibilities of Police
Once the juvenile is taken into custody,
the law enforcement officer must follow
specific statutory proceedings.27 He has
to notify the child's parents or guardians. 28
The child may be released if the parents or
guardians promise, in writing, to return
the child when requested by the court. 29
The officer may refer the case to an intake
officer or the court if the child requires
detention and shelter care. 30 Only an intake officer or the juvenile court can authorize detention or shelter care. 31
Since pre-adjudicatory detention or
shelter care is not equivalent to taking the
child into custody, section 3-815 of the
Juvenile Causes Act does not require a
showing of probable cause to detain or
shelter the child. 32 Provisions for a hearing and notice of the hearing regarding
determinations for detention or shelter
care are present in the statute. 33 There are
also statutory limitations on where the
child may be placed. 34 A police officer
can only refer the child for placement. 35
However, the child can be placed into de-

tention or shelter care prior to any hearing, and without a showing of probable
cause if, (1) the child is likely to leave the
jurisdiction; (2) it is necessary to protect
the child or public interest; or (3) there is
no person available to provide supervision
and care for the child. 36

Investigative Procedures
A. Confessions One of the most
litigated issues on appeal concerns the
confessions of juveniles. The landmark
case of In re Gault 37 held that when juveniles are in custodial interrogation,
they must be provided with adequate
Miranda 38 warnings. 39 Any waiver of
these rights must be knowingly and intelligently given. 40

• • •
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In In re Appeal No. 245,41 the juvenile
was confronted at his home by police officers investigating a series of thefts.42 By
placing the juvenile in the back seat of the
police vehicle, the juvenile was subjected
to custodial interrogation within the
meaning of the Miranda decision. 43 The
court held that the juvenile did not knowingly waive his privilege against selfincrimination and right to counsel when
inculpatory statements were given to the
investigating officers.44 The trial court is
required to look at the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the waiver. 45
The age of the juvenile alone will not
render a waiver invalid. 46 It is also true
that age coupled with a low intelligence
will not render a waiver of constitutional
rights invalidY
In King v. State,48 the court upheld the
rape and assault conviction of a fourteen-

year-old characterized as a slow reader
and slow learner. 49 The elements of age
and intelligence in waiving constitutional
rights were considered, but under the
totality of the circumstances, the state had
met its burden of proving a voluntary
waiver. 50
In WIggins v. State,51 the court upheld a
first-degree murder conviction of a fifteenyear-old based on a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutionally guaranteed
rights. 52 This waiver was challenged
strictly on the element of age and the state
met its burden of proving voluntariness. 53
In this case, earlier statements which were
not shown to be free and voluntary did
not preclude admission of inculpatory
statements given six days later. 54
In King, the failure of an interrogating
officer to allow the father of the fourteenyear-old to see his child, did not render
the admission by the juvenile invalid. 55
In Miller v. State,56 the sixteen-year-old
was given Miranda warnings and questioned for an hour and thirty-five minutes
during which time he denied any implications that he was involved in a murderY
He was fed and then requested to speak
with the officers, waived his rights, and
gave inculpatory statements. 58 His conviction was upheld as free and voluntary. 59
In applying the totality of the circumstances test, the court in Walker v. State, 60
rendered the confession invalid and therefore inadmissible. 61 The sixteen-year-old
was detained without being given Miranda
warnings, was not allowed to speak to his
mother and was shown photographs depicting the murder scene in gory detail. 62
The court stated that age alone will not
invalidate a waiver but under the totality
of the circumstances, the waiver was not
freely and voluntarily given. 63
In In re Appeal No. 245,64 the court also
held that the "fruits of the poisonous tree"
doctrine announced in Wong Sun v. United
States,65 applied to confessions by juveniles. Since the officers lacked probable
cause to take the juvenile into custody,
statements made during the interrogations were inadmissible as fruits of the
poisonous tree. 66

B. Judicial and Extrajudicial
Identifications The United States Su-

preme Court in United States v. Wade 67
and Gilbert v. California,68 held that under the sixth and fourteenth amendments,
a defendant has a constitutional right to
counsel in post-indictment pretria1lineups
where the accused is exhibited for identifying witnesses. 69 In evaluating the Wade
requirements, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals erroneously applied the
right to counsel to pre-indictment proceedings as well. 70 After Kirby v. Illinois 71
Fal~

19851The Law Forum-7

was decided, the Court abandoned the application of right to counsel in pre-indictment proceedings. 72
In Jackson v. State,73 this abandonment
was predicated on the rationale that the
accused does not face an adversarial system of justice until he is accused (indicted)
by the prosecution.1 4 The Jackson court
makes the distinction that juvenile proceedings are not criminal proceedings. 75
At the time of the lineup in Jackson,
the juvenile defendant had not been arraigned. 76 No indictment or information
had been filed against him.77 The court
further stated that even if proceedings in
juvenile court could be deemed adversarial, the defendant had no sixth amendment right to counsel. 78
In In re Appeal No. 504/ 9 extrajudicial
identification of the juvenile was made
promptly on the scene by a witness. 8o A
police officer responded to a call and saw
a juvenile fitting the physical description
of the suspect. 81 The juvenile was running and winded about five blocks from
the scene. 82 He accompanied the police
officer back to the scene where he was
identified. 83 The court held that absent
any elements of unfairness, the identification was legal and admissible. 84 The court
also held that even if the taking into custody of the juvenile was unlawful, the
identification was not "tangible" fruit of
the poisonous tree and was still admissible
evidence. 85
C. Search and Seizure In Payton
v. New York,86 the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment prohibited the police from making a
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into
a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. 87 The Court of Special
Appeals in In re Anthony F.,88 held that
Payton applies equally to juveniles and to
adults. 89 In In re Anthony P., a juvenile's
sixteen-year-old sister consented to police
entry into the juvenile's home to take him
into custody without a warrant or writ of
attachment. 9o The police officers testified
that there was no verbal communication
from the sister who answered the door. 91
She simply opened it to admit them. 92
The court held that she was competent to
consent and the entry was valid. 93
Tate v. State,94 concerned the issue of
parental consent to conduct a search for
evidence. 95 In Tate, a seventeen-year-old
was convicted of rape, kidnapping and
unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a violent crime. 96 The defendant's
mother had authority to consent to the
search of her son's bedroom which yielded
incriminating evidence. 97 The court held
that a consent to a search given by a party
8- The Law Forum/Pal4 1985

who possesses common authority over the
premises is valid against an absent nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared. 98
In McCray v. State,99 the defendant's father invited the police officers in and consented to the search of his son's room. IOO
The police found stolen property in the
area where the son slept. IOI The court
held that a consensual search was an exception to the warrant requirement and
the father had authority to consent to a
search of the premises. 102
The Education Article of the Maryland
Annotated Code l03 provides that a principal, assistant principal, or school security guard may search a student on school

premises if he has a reasonable belief that
the student has possession of an item
which violates the criminal law. 104 The
statute l05 also provides for search of the
physical plant or lockers.l06
Public schools may also utilize drug detecting dogs without offending the fourth
amendment. l07 However, once the dog
alerts authorities to the presence of contraband, a search warrant must be issued
before the area may be searched. l08
The scope and extent of school searches
has been a topic of great litigation. 109 The
controversies center over the applicability
of the fourth amendment to juveniles, the
exclusionary rule, and the standard re-

quired to justify a search and seizure. llo
The Maryland statute lll ,requires "reasonable belief" for a search of the person
of a juvenile. 112 There is no standard
codified in the statute for locker searches,
although the Attorney General I 13 has
stated that a search warrant is required for
opening a locker or physical appurtenance
when a drug-detecting dog is used. 1l4
Maryland requires probable cause for a
search warrant to be issued. 115 Therefore,
probable cause is necessary for searching
a locker when a dog is used for detection
of contraband. I 16
In In re Dominic W.,1l7 the court addressed the issues of the applicability to juveniles of the fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule, and the standard required
for school searches. 118 The case held that
the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule apply to school searches. 119 The
opinion stated that the authority to search
provided in the statute constitutes governmental action sufficient to invoke the
fourth amendment. 120 When this case was
decided, the statute required probable
cause to search a student. 121 The language
was changed in subsequent amendments,
substituting the requirement of "reasonable belief" for probable cause. In
In January of this year, the United States
Supreme Court decided New Jersey v.
T.L. 0. 123 That case concerned the search
of the purse of a fourteen-year-old suspected of smoking in a school lavatory. 124
The Court held that the fourth amendment protection applied to searches by
school officials as well as law enforcement
officers. 125 It also recognized that school
children have a legitimate expectation of
privacy. 126 A search of the child's person
is a severe violation of the privacy right. 127
However, since the fourth amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court focused on whether
the search was justified at its inception
and was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the intrusion. 128 The Court held that such a search
will be permissible in scope when measures adopted are reasonably related to
the objectives of the search. 129
Additionally, the case pointed out that
school officials do not need a warrant before searching a student under their authority.130 The Court was very clear in
stating that school officials do not need
probable cause to search a student. 131
The legality of the search depends simply
on the reasonableness under all the circumstances. l32 In so holding, the Supreme
Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision to suppress the evidence
of the search. 133

It appears that the school search statute
in Maryland 134 anticipated the New Jersey
v. T.L. 0.135 decision. Amendments to
the statute substituted the probable cause
requirement for a reasonable belief. 136
The Maryland statute also distinguishes
the search of the student and the search of
the school. 137 Based on the holding of
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,138 the Maryland
statute may be interpreted to focus on the
reasonableness of the search.139 The test
the Supreme Court announced was to balance the needs of the school and the state
in maintaining order and discipline in the
school system and the privacy interests of
the student. 140 In light of New Jersey v.
T.L.O., the Maryland statute may be
given a broad interpretation permitting
greater discretion to lie with the school
and less privacy and protection for the
student. 141
D. Discovery The Maryland Rules
of Procedure allow for an open-file policy
in discovery procedures regarding delinquent l42 or contributing l43 cases. 144 The
provisions require the state to furnish the
respondent with information or knowledge
favorable to the respondent. 145 The state
must release information regarding search
and seizure, wiretaps and eavesdropping,
statements by the respondent, and prehearing identification of the respondent
by witnesses. 146 The rule l47 also sets forth
protected matters, procedures for discovery, and a continuing duty to disclose.1 48
In CINSI49 (Children in Need of Supervision) or CINA 150 (Children in Need of
Assistance) proceedings, the court may
order discovery upon a showing of good
cause. 151

E. Diversion and Station Adjustment Programs In addition to
the Juvenile Services Administration,
some jurisdictions have established diversion or station adjustment programs. 152
These programs are usually administered
through the law enforcement agencies by
a special group of youth trained officers. 153
The programs are alternatives to the intake process of the juvenile court. 154 They
provide limited treatment and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders who have committed minor offenses.
The Court Sanctioned Pre-Intake Adjustment Program in Baltimore City is an
example of station adjustment. 155 The
program is comprised of police officers
trained as youth-service officers and is administered by the Baltimore City Police
Department.
A juvenile can be accepted into the adjustment program by contact directly with
a youth service officer or by referral from
another law enforcement officer. In order

to accept the juvenile, five parties must
agree that this program is in the best interest of the child. That is, the complainant, the juvenile, the parents or guardians,
the arresting officer (who may also be the
complainant), and the youth service officer
must approve of adjustment. If there is no
agreement, the juvenile is referred to the
intake process and the juvenile court
system.
Once the child is accepted, there are
four basic options available to the youth
service officer. The least restrictive option is to "warn and release." The police
officer may take the child into custody
and refer him to the youth service officer
who will talk to the juvenile, warn him of
the behavior, and release him to his home
(the youth service officer may do this on
the scene).
The second alternative is limited counseling. The youth service officer is trained
to provide counse~ing services and may
do so for up to a ninety-day period. The

. . . of everyone
hundredjuveniles in
the adjustment
program of
Baltimore City, only
thirteen are repeat
offenders.

officer may dismiss the child at any time
he feels the behavior has been corrected.
The officer may also extend the time for
an additional ninety-days by submitting a
written request to a juvenile court judge
setting forth the reasons for the extension.
The third option is for the youth service
officer to refer the juvenile to an agency.
The Youth Services Division cooperates
with many private and public agencies.
The services available include medical
care, dental care, psychological treatment,
single parent counseling as well as family
and individual counseling. The youth service officer makes the initial determination
for treatment and maintains contact with
the child, monitoring the care provided.
The agencies are required to submit forty-

five and ninety-day progress reports to the
officer.
The fourth available option is to place
the juvenile in a work setting. Some of the
local employers cooperate with this program and reserve positions for referred
children. The children receive wages and
may have the opportunity for permanent
employment after the ninety-day referral
period. The officer monitors the child's
progress throughout this alternative.
The basic philosophy of the diversion
and station adjustment programs is to
focus on what can be done to help the
child. Rehabilitation is the primary concern. It is a method of "preventive maintenance", treating the problem juvenile at
the initial stages before serious offenses
are committed. One source stated that out
of everyone-hundred juveniles in the adjustment program of Baltimore City, only
thirteen are repeat offenders.

Conclusion
The juvenile justice system has developed because of the need to treat children
differently than adults. 156 The difference
extends to the procedures used by law enforcement agencies that come into contact
with juveniles. The purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act l57 in Maryland is to
provide for the best interests of the child
consistent with the interest of public
safety. 158
The juvenile has been afforded specific
constitutional rights and guarantees. 159
However, those rights are not absolute
and are balanced by the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile justice system. 160
Since the courts treat juveniles differently
than adults, they do not have all the constitutional protections afforded to adults. 161
The deprivation of those rights is often
rationalized by the fact that the juvenile
system is a civil rather than criminal system. 162 The goal is to rehabilitate and not
to punish. 163
The broader issue is whether the juvenile justice system accomplishes that goal.
Police procedures have been tailored by
the courts in an effort to accomplish that
goal. 164 All too often, the courts focus
their attention on the needs of the system.
The needs of the system are not always
the needs of the child.

A. David Copperthite is a third year
student at the University of Baltimore
School of Law and is a member of the
Law Forum staff
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